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SALES AND SECURITY LAW
EDWARD T. FAGAN, JR.f
F Rom the early codifications of the law merchant, the sale
has been recognized as the center of civil law commercial
codes.' This traditional recognition continues in the pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code.2 In the words of its Chief
Reporter, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, "The law of Sales of
course became the center, with such overlap into 'agency'
aspects of distribution as is needed to clarify the bona fide
purchase and the security aspects that come in question." 3
The establishment of sales law as the hub and nucleus of
the entire Code may well explain why a large portion of the
existing Uniform Sales Act is merely reworded and modern-
ized by Code Article Two, entitled "Sales," with but a few
important substantive changes.4  Just as the jus gentium of
Roman Law achieved a great degree of international commer-
cial uniformity by virtue of its employment of universally
accepted principles, so also a code which is intended to unify
the commercial law of our states and territories should have
t Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
SII Consolato del Mare; Roles d'Oleron (1266); Ordonnance sur le com-
merce de terre (Louis XIV 1674); Ordonnance sur la marine (Louis XIV
1681).
2 The Code text matter of this article is taken from the final draft No. 2
of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code issued in the spring of 1951 as
corrected by the June 1951 revisions. The comments are the latest published,
which appear in final draft No. 1 issued in the spring of 1950.
3 Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW AND CONTEMP.
P1oa. 687, 693 (1948).
4 Professor Grant Gilmore of the code drafting staff states, "Article 2
(Sales) generally restates its predecessor, albeit with a few controversial nov-
elties, such as the abandonment of the concept of title or property in connec-
tion with the rights of parties to a sales contract and the introduction of special
rules applying to merchants and contracts between merchants." Gilmore, The
Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoa. 27, 28 (1951). See also Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code as a Problem in Codificatio, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951);
Rabel, Sales in the Proposed Commercial Cpde, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 427
(1950) ; Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 Micir. L. Rv. 603
(1950).
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as its core a body of law which has already been accepted by
these jurisdictions.
Indeed, it has been pointed out that the procedural mod-
ernization of sales law which the Code achieves is a strong
argument in itself for the Code's adoption, especially when
coupled with the radical substantive change in the related
field of security law proposed by Code Article Nine entitled
"Secured Transactions." 5
It must be conceded that the substantive changes pro-
posed by the Code in present sales law, as distinguished from
those proposed in present security law, will not directly
render obsolete the knowledge acquired in years of practice
with business transactions.6 An appreciation, however, of
the relation which exists between sales and security law, par-
ticularly as treated in the Code, makes it apparent that the
overall effect of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code on
present sales law can only be properly determined after a
joint consideration of Code Articles Two and Nine. Conse-
quently, this article will discuss the important substantive
changes which the sales section of the Code proposes in pres-
ent New York sales law,7 and in addition will contain an
analysis of the proposed Code security law.
CONTRACTUAL VERSUS TITLE THEORY
The most important change which Code Article Two pro-
poses in the present law of sales is the adoption of the "con-
tractual approach" as a substitute for the "title" or "prop-
erty" concept presently employed. This proposal represents
a fundamental change in the basic theory of sales law, and
would substantially alter the whole approach to the law of
sales as applied under the Uniform Sales Act and New York
decisions.
5 See Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW AND Co=nrMP.
PROB. 3 (1951); Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code--Sales; Should it be
Enacted?, 59 YALE L. J. 821 (1950).6 See Foreword, page 1.
7 For a detailed section by section analysis of most of the procedural change
proposed by the Code in present sales law, see Goodwin, How the Adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Sales in Oregon,
30 O. L. REv. 139, 212, 330 (1951).
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At common law and under the present New York
statute,8 title is the basis for determining risk of loss, rights,
obligations and remedies under sales contracts. In recent
years, however, it has become apparent to lawyers that the
commercial world objects to the necessity of reliance upon
abstract legal concepts as a guide to the solution of indi-
vidual business problems.9 Code draftsmen deemed it essen-
tial, therefore, that the new commercial code express the
legal consequences of certain fact situations rather than
merely enunciate concepts which might create uncertainty
when related to specific cases.' 0
Accordingly, the new Code rejects the present legal con-
cern with passage of title and deals with the issues between
seller and buyer solely in terms of step by step performance
or non-performance under the contract of sale." Of neces-
sity, the new Code does contain certain title provisions for
situations where the applicability of "public" regulation de-
pends upon a "sale" or upon location of title without further
definition.' 2 For this purpose, unless otherwise explicitly
agreed, actual title to goods passes when the seller makes de-
livery of the goods, regardless of any stipulation concerning
cash sale.' 3 If no delivery is necessary, title passes upon ap-
propriation of goods to the contract. Any title reservation
following such delivery or appropriation results in the reten-
tion by the seller of a security interest only. Any refusal to
receive by the buyer or a justified revocation of acceptance
will revest title in the seller.
Apart from public regulation problems the new Code
emphasizes the fact that title is no longer the focal point of
the sales contract. In fact the new Code defines a "contract
8 N. Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW §§ 98-101.
9 "The past generation has seen a general reaction against conceptions of
absolute ownership. Both in Europe and America there has been more and
more stress on a functional approach to property in terms of the apportionment
of use, possession, and disposition. This is most evident in our commercial
law, in which the question of title has lost most of its former importance and
instead the nature of the goods, the type of transaction, the assumption of risk,
and similar factors have become determinative of the rights of the parties."
BERMAN, JusTicE IN RUSSIA 98 (1950).
10 UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 2-101, Comment (Spring 1950).
"UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 2-401, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).12 Ibid.
23 UNIFORMM CEomRCIAL CODE § 2-401 (Spring 1951).
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for sale" as including both a present sale of goods and a con-
tract to sell goods at a future time, thereby abolishing the
common law distinction between the contract to make the
sale and the sale itself.14 In effect, contract rights replace
proprietary rights for all purposes, unless the Code expressly
provides otherwise. 15
In line with this reasoning, under the new Code, unless
otherwise explicitly agreed, as soon as goods are appropri-
ated to the contract the buyer obtains a present interest in
them, called an insurable interest. This interest arises inde-
pendently of any transfer of title or risk of loss.16 The seller
on the other hand retains an insurable interest so long as any
security interest in the goods remains in him. The comments
of an earlier Code draft make it clear that these interests,
stemming from appropriation, are the basis for the applica-
tion of the contractual approach in matters of risk of loss
and remedies. 17
The logic of the contractual approach is evident upon a
consideration of the problem of risk of loss. Under the new
Code, the seller by his individual action cannot shift the risk
of loss to the buyer unless his action conforms with all the
conditions resting on him under the contract.'" So also, if
the buyer breaches before the risk of loss has passed under
the contract, the seller may, to the extent of any deficiency
in his effective insurance coverage, treat the risk of loss as
resting on the buyer.
The choice of remedies is no longer dependent upon the
question of whether title has or has not passed before breach.
Under the new Code, neither passage of title to the goods nor
the appointment of a day certain for payment is material to
a price action.'9 An action for price plus incidental damages
may be maintained if goods are accepted or if the risk of loss
has passed or if the goods have already been identified to the
contract and cannot be resold at a reasonable price. The
right of resale exists in the seller after any breach or insol-
- Id. § 2-106.
15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
16 UNIFORM Co mFRcIAL CoDE § 2-501 (Spring 1951).1 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-502, Comments 1-5 (May 1949).
IS UNIFORM CO mMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-509, 2-510 (Spring 1951).
19 UNIFORM COMMERCiAL CODE § 2-709, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
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vency of the buyer, including anticipatory breach. In fact,
if the contract is breached and the goods are unfinished, the
seller may nevertheless complete the goods unless such action
would materially increase the damages. 20 Damages are the
difference between the resale and contract price plus inci-
dental damages, minus any saving as a result of breach. Rea-
sonable notice of resale should be given to the buyer except
in the case of public sale of perishables or goods which
threaten to speedily decline in value.2 1
The buyer is given similar favored treatment in respect
to his remedies under the new Code by liberalizing the appli-
cation of the doctrine of specific performance.22 If specific
performance is not available, "cover" will be afforded. Cover
allows the buyer the difference between an actual contract
made by the buyer with a third party as a substitute within
a reasonable time after breach and the contract price, coupled
with incidental damages.2 8 As an alternative to "cover," the
buyer may recover the difference between market price and
contract price at the time of breach, plus incidental damages.
Here the contractual approach to a buyer's damages removes
damage pricing difficulties which presently exist in New
York law because of the title concept. 24  Under the Code,
the place for determining current market price is the place
for tender, or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation
of acceptance, the place of arrival, since the yardstick is the
market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had
he sought that relief.25
RIGHT OF STOPPAGE
Present New York sales law gives the seller the right of
stoppage in transit only upon insolvency of the buyer prior
2 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-704 (Spring 1951).
21 Id. § 2-706.
-Id. § 2-716.
231d. §§ 2-712, 2-713.
24 Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E.
834 (1922) (wherein buyer's damages were based on San Francisco market
prices in a breach of contract action involving a shipment F.O.B. San Francisco
to New York, the court holding that title passed at place of shipment, even
though the right of inspection was reserved by the buyer and the goods were
shipped seller's order).2 5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-713(2) (Spring 1951).
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to delivery.26 The new Code proposes to extend this right
to include any breach by the buyer prior to delivery.2 7 Either
party has a right under the new Code to demand adequate
assurance of due performance when reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to such performance. Failure
to supply such assurance within thirty days after justified
demand will constitute a breach.2  It is therefore important
to note that this failure to supply assurance will in itself be
grounds for stoppage, as distinguished from the present
necessity to establish real insolvency.
In addition to the right to stop in transit because of a
mere threat of insolvency, or for that matter, for any other
breach, the new Code will allow the seller to reclaim the
goods already delivered to the buyer if insolvency exists
within ten days following such delivery.29 Since this gives
him preference over other creditors, reclamation if used is
an exclusive remedy.
POLICING PROVISIONS
It is a well established canon of interpretation that in
determining intent ". . . the fact that a construction con-
tended for would make the contract unreasonable and place
one of the parties at the mercy of the other may be properly
taken into consideration." 30 Harsh results in individual
cases may not be avoided by judicial action, however, if the
contract speaks clearly and without ambiguity for it is not
the duty of the court to make the contract for the parties.
This canon of interpretation, with its limitations, exists
in present New York sales law.31 While it is true that there
have been New York decisions holding that fine print in com-
mercial contracts is unenforceable,3 2 and statutes protect the
buyer in retail installment sale contracts by requiring pro-
26 N. Y. PEns. PRop. LAW § 138.
2 7 UNIFORM COmmERcIAJL CoDE § 2-705 (Spring 1951).
28 Id. § 2-609.
29 Id. § 2-702.
30 Schoellkopf v. Coatsworth, 166 N. Y. 77, 84 (1901).
31 Sanford v. Brown Brothers Co., 208 N. Y. 90, 101 N. E. 797 (1912).
32 Arthur Philip Export Corp. v. Leathertone, Inc., 275 App. Div. 102, 87
N. Y. S. 2d 665 (1st Dep't 1949).
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visions to be in no less than eight-point type, 33 nevertheless,
the objection has in the main been directed against form
contracts.
The new Code completely removes this judicial restric-
tion in present law by allowing the court on its own motion
to exercise an extensive judicial policing of sales contracts.
The court is permitted to pass on the unconscionability of
the whole contract or a particular clause therein and make
a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.34 Under such
power, it may refuse to enforce the contract or strike any un-
conscionable clauses. In addition the court may look beyond
the terms of the contract to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect as an aid in making this determination.3 5  The
Code comment states: "The principle is one of the preven-
tion of unfair surprises and not of disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." 31
This judicial freedom may reflect in part the approach
once taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Schlegel
Manufacturing Co. v. Cooper's Glue Factory3 7 where the
court denied damages in a requirement contract on the
ground that the contract lacked mutuality. Actually, war
conditions, causing the price to rise about two hundred per
cent, made the risk assumed basically unconscionable under
the contract. Hence it has been suggested that unconscion-
ability rather than lack of mutuality was the true ground
for the court's decision. 8
The Code provisions, however, indicate much broader
court power than that implied from the Schlegel case.3 9 Com-
ment under an earlier Code draft states that even if parties
deliberately enter into a lopsided bargain with full knowledge
and awareness and have actually assented to unconscionable
clauses, the court may still refuse to enforce the clause or
agreement as unconscionable. 40  Such a policy may well re-
33 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 64a; N. Y. LiEN LAW § 239-i.
3 4 UNIFORM CoM mECIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 148 (1921).
38 See 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 146-150 (1950).
39 See note 37 supra.40 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 4 (May 1949).
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sult in the substitution of equity notions of fair exchange
for the principle of freedom of contract.
PAiOL EVIDENCE RULE
Closely related to judicial policing of contracts is the
judicial determination of the intent of the contracting
parties. Under present New York law, before the court may
go beyond a written contract to establish this intent, it must
first determine that the language in the writing is ambiguous;
otherwise there would be a violation of the parol evidence
rule.41 Provision is made in present law for the introduction
of evidence concerning custom and practice, but only to ex-
plain equivocal phraseology. 42
Under the new Code, evidence of course of dealing, usage
of trade and course of performance is admissible although
the written agreement may be clear and unambiguous on its
face.43  The Code comment states: "Such writings are to
be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings
between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for
granted when the document was phrased. Unless carefully
negated they have become an element of the meaning of the
words used." 44
The Code places particular emphasis upon the fact that
merchants are in a category separate and apart from the
casual or inexperienced buyer or seller.45  Hence, under the
Code, commercial practice and course of dealing play im-
portant roles in determining contractual intent between such
merchants. 46 This differentiation in rules where merchants
are involved has been criticized on the ground that it may
breed much litigation over whether a party is or is not a
merchant in individual cases. 47 It is interesting to note, in
line with this criticism, that while the codes of most civil
4' See Green v. Wachs, 254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930); Hopper v.
Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 20 N. E. 350 (1889).42 N. Y. PaRs. PROP. LAW § 99(2).
4 3
UNIFORM COMmERciAL CODE § 2-202 (Spring 1951).4 4 UNIFORM Co MER iAL CODE § 2-202, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
45 UNIFORM Com ERCIAL CODE § 2-104 (Spring 1951).
-. Td. §§ 1-205, 2-208.
47 See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Comnercial
Code, 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 561 (1950).
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law systems distinguish between civil law and the law mer-
chant by applying separate rules to mercantile transactions,
the most recent continental approach, as exemplified by the
Italian Civil Code of 1942, has been to abandon the merchant
category entirely by a merger of civil and commercial law.
48
EXTENSION OF WARRANTY LIABILITY
Present New York sales law requires privity to exist be-
tween the parties before any liability may be established for
breach of warranty, either express or implied.49 Other jur-
isdictions have gone further, holding that this liability is
extended to include all parties who may reasonably be ex-
pected to use or consume the goods originally warranted. 50
The new Code adopts a "middle of the road" position
between these two extremes by extending the seller's war-
ranty to any natural person who is in the family or house-
hold of the buyer or a guest in his home, "... if it is reason-
able to expect that such person may use, consume or be af-
fected by the goods and who is injured in person by a breach
of the warranty." 51 The seller may not exclude or limit this
extended liability. This position reflects an abandonment by
Code draftsmen of the more liberal view expressed in earlier
Code drafts which extended the seller's warranty to include
all parties who may reasonably be expected to use or con-
sume the goods originally warranted.52
From the point of view of New York law, however, the
Code extension of warranty liability to the buyer's family
will remove the present uncertainty on this point, created
by the dictum in the Court of Appeals case of Pearlman v.
Garrod Shoe 0o.8  In this case, recovery was allowed for
4 See Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 LAw AND CoNTEmP. PROB. 331, 336 (1951). See also Sereni, On Teaching
Comparative Law, 64 HA~v. L. lEv. 770, 777 (1951).
49 Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N. Y. 73, 161 N. E. 423
(1928) ; Chysky v. Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).50 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S. W. 2d 445 (1936) ; Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 199 (1933).
See also Llewellyn, On Warranty of Qiality and Society: II, 37 COL. L. REv.
341 (1937).
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (Spring 1951).
52UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (May 1949).
53276 N. Y. 172, 177, 11 N. E. 2d 718, 719 (1937).
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injuries and death resulting from a defective shoe purchased
for deceased plaintiff by her mother. The court recognized
that the general rule in New York barred breach of warranty
suits in the absence of contractual privity. While recovery
was based on negligence, the court observed that the special
circumstances might present an exception to the rule ap-
plicable to warranty cases. Under the Code, breach of war-
ranty would be the obvious cause of action on these facts.
INTERRELATION OF SALES AND SECURITY LAW
The preceding sections of this article have dealt solely
with the more significant substantive innovations which Code
Article Two proposes in present New York sales law. The
scope of sales law, however, is nowhere defined with particu-
larity for law knows no natural compartmentalization. In-
deed, the fact patterns which sales law undertakes to regu-
late often encompass situations which might with equal right
be denominated security transactions, as for example, the
conditional sale contract. 54
For this reason, Code draftsmen have rejected the arbi-
trary grouping of the Uniform Sales Act and other sales
legislation, and have placed each commercial relationship in
the Code where a considered analysis would indicate it
belongs. 55 One of the results of such policy is that to prop-
erly evaluate the changes wrought by the Code in existing
sales law, the lawyer must proceed from Code Article Two
to a study of Code Article Nine, for it is there that many
notions traditionally grouped under present sales law will
be found.
COMPLETE SECURITY LAW CHANGE PROPOSED
Article Nine, entitled "Secured Transactions, Sales,
Chattel Paper and Contract Rights," " is that portion of the
new commercial Code which, as previously stated, proposes
the most radical departure from present New York sales and
4 See Kripke, The Modernization of Commercit Security Under the Uni-
formn Commercial Code, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 183 (1951).
5 UNIFOR CoMmmCaL CODE § 2-102, Comments 1, 2 (Spring 1950).
56 Revised title, June 1951 Revisions.
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security law. By combining portions of sales with security
law, it supersedes not only the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, but also existing
state legislation dealing with chattel mortgages, factor's
liens, pledges, and assignments of accounts receivable.5 7
The method normally employed in this symposium, of
comparing present New York law with proposed Code
change, is inapplicable at this point since the Code com-
pletely discards present security law and substitutes an en-
tirely new system in its stead.58 For this reason, the theories
and principles embodied in the proposed system shall be
treated independently and not on a comparative basis.
The explanation for this wholesale scrapping of present
law lies in the conviction of the Code drafters that the pres-
ent security system is rapidly becoming unworkable. Se-
curity law in recent years has grown in complexity at an
alarming rate without adequate supervision or regulation.
The recognition of new security devices, approved by a
rapidly expanding lending business, has caused ever widen-
ing gaps in its structure. Increased costs and great uncer-
tainty as to filing requirements and individual rights have
resulted. The Code is intended to provide a simple and
unified structure within which the immense variety of pres-
ent and future secured financing transactions can go forward
with less cost and greater certainty. 9 This structure is best
understood by examining first its overall scope. This entails
a consideration of new concepts and basic theories. Once
these are established, the procedural provisions will be sum-
marized, for it is felt that the elements of form are capable
of simple explanation despite reputable opinion to the
contrary.60
57 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment (Spring 1950).
58 Professor Grant Gilmore states: "Article 9 . . . deliberately cuts loose
from all anchorage in the past. It cuts across What have been regarded as
separate fields of law, introduces a completely new terminology. . . ." Gilmore,
Tie Secured Transactions Article of the Comnercial Code, 16 LAW AND
CONTEP. PRoB. 27, 28 (1951).
59 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment (Spring 1950).
60 Homer Kripke in discussing the Secured Transactions Article states in
part: "No paper of ordinary scope could summarize all of these provisions
adequately or discuss all of the policy questions they raise. . . ." Kripke, The
Secured Tranwactions Provisions of the Uniform Connmercial Code, 35 VA. L.
Rav. 577 (1949).
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THEORIES OF PROPOSED SECURITY SYSTEM
(a) Functional Approach
The complexity of present security law results mainly
from the myriad formal distinctions existing between se-
curity devices. Judicial emphasis placed on the importance
of locating title to the collateral creates further problems.61
The Code, as a solution, applies one set of rules to any trans-
action, regardless of its form, which is intended to create a
"security interest" 62 in personal property. Its scope ex-
cludes only liens regulated by federal statutes and liens for
materials, services, and rent.63  The transactions covered,
however, must also comply with applicable state statutes
regulating small loans, usury, and retail installment sales. 64
The "contract approach" of Article Two is reapplied and ac-
tual location of title is held immaterial.65 The debtor still
retains rights in the collateral which he may alienate and
which can be reached by his creditors.66
Necessary distinctions, allowing for flexibility, are made
along functional lines by dividing all collateral into five basic
types: chattel paper,6 7 accounts, contract rights, instruments,
and goods. Wherever appropriate, the Code states special
rules applicable to financing transactions involving each type
of collateral. In the case of goods, the nature of the use of
the collateral is significant in determining the scope of pro-
tection. Goods are subdivided, according to use, into con-
sumer goods, equipment, farm products and inventory. The
61 See In re White Plains Ice Service, 109 F. 2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940);
Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Electric Co., 228 App. Div. 577, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 108 (4th Dep't 1930).
62 The Code defines security interest as "an interest in property which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The reservation by a seller or con-
signor of property notwithstanding identification of goods to a contract for
sale or notwithstanding shipment or delivery is a 'security interest'." UNIFoRM
CommERciAL CoDE § 1-201(37) (Spring 1951).
63 Id. § 9-104.64 Id. §9-203 (2).
65 Id. § 9-202.
66d. §9-311(a), (b).
67 The Code states in part: "Chattel paper is a new term but one readily
understood. It includes the conventional conditional sales contract and chattel
mortgage and also the chattel lease.. . ." UNIFORM COmMERCIAL CODE § 9-105,
Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
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principal use to which the goods are put determines their
class in borderline cases. 8
(b) The Purchase Money ,Security Interest
While it is true that the Code proposes an entirely new
legal approach to secured transactions, even this metamor-
phosis recognizes and incorporates certain basic truisms of
the present system.
Security law has always afforded preferred treatment
to lenders who make advances for the purchase of goods,
since the loan supplies collateral which would otherwise be
unavailable. Despite this favored position, financiers have
continually sought to remove such transactions from the se-
curity field by various devices such as the chattel or purchase
money mortgage, conditional sale, and trust receipt. Equity
controls and the advent of recording statutes have done much
to keep alive this unending battle of legal distinctions.
The Code wisely adopts the existing priority of pur-
chase money obligations yet quietly buries the age-old con-
troversy of form by creating a new security interest appro-
priately labeled "purchase money security interest." This
interest attaches to all transactions wherein a present ad-
vance is made for the purchase of collateral or an interest in
the collateral is retained by the seller to secure the price 9
It thus replaces the chattel mortgage, conditional sale and
trust receipt. Based on the "new value" theory of the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act,70 the security interest created by
a present advance has priorities equal to those accorded trust
receipts under present law.
The new interest arises solely in a conditional seller or
in a lender who makes advances for purchase purposes.
Tracing difficulties in the latter case are avoided since ad-
vances made within ten days of receipt of collateral will
create the lien even though the value given was not in fact
used to pay the price.71
6 8 UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 9-109 (Spring 1951), Comment 2 (Spring
1950).8 9 UNIFoRM COM!mECL&L CODE § 9-107 (Spring 1951).70 UNIFORm CommERcIAL CODE § 9-107, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).7 1 UNIFORM! COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107(c) (Spring 1951).
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(c) Codification of Accounts Receivable Financing
Receivables and contract rights, because of their resem-
blance to inventory, are rated high on the list of liquid assets
used in security finance. A receivable may be an open ac-
count or in itself an obligation secured by a conditional sale
or chattel mortgage. The latter, under the Code, will ordi-
narily fall in the category of chattel paper.
The majority of states, including New York, do not pres-
ently require filing to validate the account or contract rights
assignment despite their widespread use as financing de-
vices.72 In addition to obvious creditor hardships, conflicts
of law questions raise vexing problems in these jurisdic-
tions.7 3  Yet, where filing is required, there exists no uni-
formity as to situs of accounts or recording procedure. In
short, the present field of accounts receivable financing needs
regulation and unification which the Code attempts to
supply.
In recognition of current financing practice, the Code
places both the absolute and collateral assignment of ac-
counts or contract rights (except wage assignments) in the
category of security transactions.7 4 Consequently, the abso-
lute assignment, although actually a sale, must conform to
the formal requirements for the creation of a security in-
terest. Both the assignee buyer and the assignee for col-
lateral purposes must file to perfect the assignment.7
Problems have always existed in connection with realiza-
tion on this type of collateral in view of the rights of the ac-
count debtor originating in the sales transaction. Cut off
clauses, i.e., agreements not to assert defenses against as-
signees, are utilized under present law as a partial solution,
72 See Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable,
13 LAw AND CONTEMP. PRn. 643 (1948).
73 See Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 182 App. Div. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st
Dep't 1918); Wishnick v. Preserves and Honey, Inc., 153 Misc. 596, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 420 (1934); see also 1946 LEG. Doc. No. 65(k), 1946 RPORT, N. Y.
LAW RmsioN CommissioN.
7 4 UFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (a), (b) (Spring 1951).
75 UxIFORm CommERcILa. CoDE § 9-105, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
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although New York law places definite limitations on their
effectiveness. 70
Under the Code, the assignee of a purchase money se-
curity interest in consumer goods is subject to any claims or
defenses arising out of the sale. A holder in due course of
a negotiable instrument which was part of such a security
agreement, is also subject to such claims or defenses."7 Cut
off clauses in these instances are unenforceable. The re-
striction is limited however to the consumer sale in line with
the Code distinctions between commercial and consumer
financing.78
"Cut off clauses" in sales of other than consumer goods
are enforceable by the assignee as to personal but not real
defenses, except that warranties contained in the original
contract may not be disclaimed or limited.7 9 In absence of
the cut off clause, the assignee of an account is subject to
any defense arising from the contract or any claim against
the assignor which accrues before the debtor receives notifi-
cation of the assignment."0
(d) Recognition of the Floating Lien
Early in the development of security law the after-
acquired property clause was held void as a matter of public
policy when used in chattel mortgages.81 Since liens cannot
validly attach to changing stock unless the collateral is made
flexible or the liens continually renewed, the immediate effect
of the holding was the emasculation of one of the essentials
of commercial growth-large scale inventory financing.
An attempt was made to remedy the situation in the in-
dustrial areas by the passage of Factor's Lien Acts, modeled
on the early New York statute which permitted the floating
lien in the mercantile field.8 2  The resulting illogical and
76Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Associates, Inc., 276 App. Div. 766, 92
N. Y. S. 2d 579 (2d Dep't 1949).
77 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-206(1) (June 1951).
78 The May 1949 Draft of the Code contained an entire part (Part 6)
dealing with consumer financing, which has been since deleted.
7 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §'9-206(2), (3) (June 1951).80 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318 (Spring 1951).
"I See Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security, 57 YALE L. J. 517, 533 (1947).
82 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45.
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anomalous state of the law both in New York and other jur-
isdictions is attributable to the failure to correlate factor's
lien statutes with the law governing mortgages.8 3
Under the Code, after-acquired property clauses are vali-
dated without qualification, although in deference to the dis-
tinction drawn between commercial and consumer financing,
consumer goods do not come within the scope of the clause
unless acquired within ten days after the secured party gives
value.8 4 The Code also validates security agreements which
provide that collateral under them shall secure future ad-
vances, for these are merely variations of the floating lien."'
The theory underlying the Code approach to the problem
is based on the general assumption that by liberalizing lender
operations and simplifying the taking of security, broad new
vistas will be opened to security financing with resultant
benefits to both debtor and creditor alike.
Protection is provided the floating lien from third party
creditor attack since the debtor is permitted to use or sell the
collateral without restriction. 8 Any sale of collateral re-
sults merely in a continuation of the security interest in the
proceeds. If originally perfected, it continues in its perfected
form for ten days after receipt of the proceeds and then must
be refiled unless the continuation was provided for in the
original security agreement.8 7 This affects accounts receiv-
able financing in that the assignee who has not subjected ac-
counts to his control is no longer required to closely supervise
the assignor in the collection of proceeds since the lien auto-
matically transfers.88
The threat of voidable preference which might exist in
bankruptcy proceedings by virtue of the after-acquired prop-
erty interest is avoided by providing that the interest is not
83 See Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW AND CONEMIP. PROB. 49, 50
(1951).8 4 UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 9-204(3), (4) (Spring 1951).
851d. §9-204(5).86 Id. § 9-205.
87 Id. § 9-306.
88 Repealing the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) (wherein
the Supreme Court of the United States held as a rule of New York law that
it was ". . . inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation of
a lien" for a financier to allow the collection of accounts assigned as security
without requiring an account of the proceeds).
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taken for an antecedent debt. 9 However, security interests
in proceeds are affected by bankruptcy to the extent that the
secured party is restricted to the amount of cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution
of insolvency proceedings.90
PRINCIPLES OF CODE SECURITY SYSTEM
(a) Formal Requisites of the Security Interest
The formal requisites which determine the origin and
validity of a security interest are reduced to a minimum
under the Code. To originate, a security interest must have
as its basis either the physical transfer of property as se-
curity or a written security agreement signed by the debtor 91
and reasonably identifying 92 the collateral. If the collateral
is oil, gas, crops, or minerals, then the writing must also con-
tain a reasonable identification of the land concerned. The
interest cannot attach pursuant to such agreement until the
debtor has rights in the collateral and value is given by the
secured party.93
(b) Perfecting the Interest
Once a security interest validly attaches and is per-
fected, unless expressly subordinated by the security agree-
ment,94 it creates an enforceable priority over all subsequent
security interests and ordinary lien creditors in the same
collateral.9 5 Subsequent purchasers of the collateral will
also take subject to the perfected interest in most instances.
Perfecting the security interest is accomplished either
by transferring possession of the collateral to the secured
party or by filing notice of the interest.96 This general rule
is qualified in one important respect. The Code makes it un-
89UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108(2) (Spring 1951).
9O Id. § 9-306(2).
911d. §9-203(1) (a), (b).
92 Id. § 9-110.
93 Id. § 9-204(1).
94 Id. § 9-316.
95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
96 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302 (June 1951).
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necessary to file liens in connection with direct sales to con-
sumers. Therefore purchase money security interests in con-
sumer goods or in farm equipment not in excess of $2,500
(other than motor vehicles or goods affixed to realty) are
perfected when they attach, without transfer of possession
or filing.9 7
It is important to note that by Code definition, the pos-
session sufficient to perfect a security interest must be actual
possession and is not obtained if goods are left on the debtor's
premises although controlled by the secured party and cov-
ered by a warehouse receipt 8  In such case the security in-
terest can be perfected only by filing. This changes New
York law which treats such a field warehousing device as a
pledge, thereby making recordation and acknowledgment of
the lien unnecessary. 9
Filing, the alternative method for perfecting security in-
terests, is intended for the protection of non-possessory in-
terests with the aforementioned exceptions. The Code, how-
ever, makes no provision for filing a security interest in
documents or instruments, and therefore such an interest is
not enforceable against third parties unless actual possession
is transferred to the secured party.100 The Code provides a
grace period of twenty-one days' protection from the time
this non-possessory security interest attaches to such col-
lateral if new value is given for the interest and in any event
from the time possession is relinquished by the secured
party.101 This protection is subordinate to any rights which
might accrue during the period to a holder in due course.10 2
This grace period is to provide for short term transactions
where the debtor must have possession of the collateral-for
example, to get the goods which are represented by the docu-
ments or for a "day loan" of securities to a broker.10 3
97 Id. § 9-302 (1) (c); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §§ 65, 69 reach a contrary
result. Filing of conditional sales for resale is not recognized yet filing of
conditional sales to consumers is required.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-305(1), (2) (Spring 1951).
99 Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873) ; Babcock v. Edson, 82 Misc. 144,
143 N. Y. Supp. 399 (County Ct. 1913); see Note, 133 A. L. R. 209 (1941).
100 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303(3) (Spring 1951).
101UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-304(1), (2) (June 1951).
202 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-309 (Spring 1951).
103 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304, Comment (Spring 1950).
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(c) Firing Procedure
Filing is accomplished by the tender of a financing state-
ment plus filing fee to the filing officer.1 04 A financing state-
ment need only be a copy of the security agreement signed
by and including the addresses of both parties. 10 5 Such no-
tice in itself is not too informative. The Code therefore per-
mits the debtor to submit to the secured party a statement
of the current unpaid indebtedness plus an itemized list of
the collateral covering it, with a request that it be approved
or corrected. 0 6 The secured party must comply with such a
request within two weeks after receipt. Such list is then
available to third parties who seek verified details not con-
tained in the filed notice.
The Code has incorporated the centralized state filing
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act with county recording in
establishing a single filing system to replace the present sys-
tem of different files for each security device subject to filing
requirements. Since centralized state filing is most useful
where a business enterprise is involved, all security interests
in accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, inventory and
equipment are filed at the state capital. °T This allows the
credit agencies to have one easy place of search of records
for all debtors in the state. Anticipating opposition to this
broad revision of present recording systems, the drafters of
the Code have added an optional clause providing for the
filing of these interests in the county of the debtor's places
of business, provided they are all in one county, if the legis-
lature should require local in addition to central filing as
regards commercial financing.
Local filing, in the county of the debtor's residence, is
reserved strictly for consumer goods and farm equipment.
If the debtor is a non-resident, then filing is accomplished
in the county where the goods are located. Security interests
in crops must also be filed in the county where grown.' 08
104 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-403(1) (Spring 1951).
10 5 Id. § 9-402(1).1ld. §9-208(1), (2), (3).
107 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-401 (1) (a) (June 1951).
108 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-401(b) (Spring. 1951).
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At present, the Code requires only one filing which
covers any subsequent change of residence, place of business
or relocation of the collateral within the jurisdiction. The
most recent draft revision intimates by comment, however,
that re-recording in the new location will be required.'0 9
The validity of security interests which attach to per-
sonal property prior to its transfer into a new jurisdiction
depend on the law of the jurisdiction of attachment. Yet
filing in the new jurisdiction is always required for perfect-
ing such interests although if perfected prior to transfer,
they continue as such for a period of four months after
transfer.'" Security interests in mobile equipment normally
used in more than one jurisdiction are filed in the jurisdic-
tion where the debtor's chief place of business is located."'
Since accounts and contract rights are not represented by
paper or tangible property, they may be properly filed only
in the jurisdiction where the assignor's office which contains
such records is located.112
Filing may be terminated at any time by filing a termi-
nation statement signed by the secured party, which he must
furnish the debtor on demand once the obligation is sat-
isfied. 1 3 If a termination statement has not been filed, then
after maturity date if stated in the filing, or in absence of
such date, then five years after filing, the filing officer may
notify the secured party that filing will lapse unless a con-
tinuation is filed within sixty days. Such refiling will result
in an additional five-year coverage." 4
(d) Conflicting Security Interests
The question of conflicting security interests in the same
collateral is resolved by applying the ordinary rule of prior-
ity, viz, interests rank in the order of time of perfection.";
The floating lien is insured adequate protection since later
109 UNIFORM CoMFMEcIAL CODE § 9-401(3) (June 1951).
l Id. § 9-103(2).
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103(1) (C) (Spring 1951).
"1
2 Id. § 9-103(1) (b).
'13 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-404 (June 1951).
214 Id. §9-403(3).
315 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 (Spring 1951).
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advances and provisions for interests in after-acquired col-
lateral pursuant to the original security agreement receive
the priority of the originally-perfected interest." 6
The purchase money interest, because of its favored posi-
tion under the Code, takes priority over an after-acquired
property clause, provided the interest is perfected within ten
days after the acquisition of such property." 7 If the col-
lateral is inventory, the priority will not extend to the pur-
chase money interest unless notification is given to the
original secured party prior to possession by the debtor.
Conflicting purchase money interests rank equally unless the
actual purchase can be identified with one interest and such
interest is perfected within ten days after the purchase.",8
A security interest in collateral which by attachment be-
comes part of realty or other goods after the interest orig-
inates, takes priority over all claims to the realty or other
goods existing at the time of attachment. Filing is not neces-
sary to achieve this priority.1 9
Subsequent to attachment, however, purchasers, prior
encumbrancers to the extent of new advances, and lien credi-
tors of such realty or other goods who have no actual knowl-
edge of the interest will take free of it unless it is filed. If
the collateral is attached to realty, filing is accomplished in
the office where a mortgage on the realty is recorded.120
Present New York law which allows severance of such
collateral by the secured party if no material injury results,
has created much uncertainty and confusion.12 ' It is diffi-
cult to determine in many instances whether there will be a
material injury caused by the removal. The Code settles this
issue by permitting the removal in all cases upon reimburse-
ment of those injured, other than the debtor, for the cost of
repair caused by the removal. Security may be required be-
fore such removal is permitted. 22
1161d. §9-312(2), (3).
11"Id. § 9-312(5).
18 Ibid.119 d. §§9-313(1), 9-314(1).
V2O Id. § 9-401 (1) (c).
'121 N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAW § 67; In re Whitlock Avenue in City of N. Y.,
278 N. Y. 276, 16 N. E. 2d 281 (1938).
122 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE §§ 9-313(2), 9-314(2) (Spring 1951).
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The "attachment priority" applies also to a security in-
terest in a raw material or component part which loses its
identity through a subsequent processing with other mate-
rials. The interest will continue in the product or resulting
mass and, if perfected, in its perfected form without the
necessity of refiling.123
(e) ights of Purchasers of Collateral
A purchaser of collateral will ordinarily take subject to
a perfected security interest but if the secured party files a
financing statement in which he claims a security interest
in proceeds, the debtor has unlimited authority to sell the
collateral free of the security interest, in the ordinary course
of business.12 4
Present New York law, in effect under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which gives superiority to the interest
of subsequent purchasers of collateral in certain instances, 2 '
is continued in fundamentally the same form under the Code.
For example, a buyer of inventory goods in the ordinary
course of business, even with actual knowledge, takes free of
a perfected security interest in the inventory. 26 So also, a
buyer for value of chattel paper in the ordinary course of
business, takes free of a perfected non-possessory security in-
terest in such paper.'2 7 As distinguished from the buyer of
inventory goods, the buyer of chattel paper must take posses-
sion without actual knowledge of the non-possessory interest
to defeat it.
Favored treatment is also afforded the purchaser of con-
sumer goods or farm equipment (other than motor vehicles
or goods affixed to realty) valued not in excess of $2,500
which are subject to a purchase money interest. While pur-
chase money security interests in these items become per-
fected upon attachment, unless the lien is actually filed, sub-
sequent purchasers of such goods or equipment who buy for
3.2 3 1d. §9-315(1).
22 4 Id. § 9-307(3).
125 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 58(2); Citizens National Bank of Springville
v. Conger, 176 Misc. 1048, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
128 UNIFORII COMMERCIAL CODE §9-307(1) (Spring 1951).
127 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-308 (June 1951).
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their own use without actual knowledge of the interest take
free of it. 2 8
(f) Procedure on Default
Upon default of the debtor, the secured party may pro.
ceed both to judgment on the claim and against the collateral
by assumption of possession, public or private sale, lease, or
other disposition. 129 He may prepare or process it for dis-
position if necessary and dispose of it on the debtor's
premises. 30 The debtor, on the other hand, has the right
to reclaim the collateral at any time prior to disposition
by tendering payment of all sums due plus reasonable
expenses.' 3 '
The only restriction on the method or manner of dis-
position is that it be "commercially reasonable." 132 A fail-
ure in this respect will cause the secured party to be re-
strained by court order, and to suffer liability for any
resulting loss. 33  It seems fair to predict that the "commer-
cially reasonable" requirement will be the basis of much liti-
gation despite the fact that both section and comment elabo-
rate upon its meaning and application.
Disposition transfers to the purchaser for value all the
debtor's rights in the collateral and discharges the security
interest under which it is made plus all subordinate in-
terests. 34 Appropriate notification of the intended disposi-
tion must be sent to the debtor and other secured parties
unless the collateral is perishable or customarily sold on a
recognized market.135
Following disposition, the debtor is entitled to any sur-
plus remaining after reasonable expenses, satisfaction of the
indebtedness, and, on written demand, satisfaction of the
12SUNIFORM COmMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2) (Spring 1951). The June 1951
Revision notes that such buyers may in later revisions be placed in the same
category as buyers of inventory.
229 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501(1) (June 1951).
130 Id. §§ 9-503, 9-504(1).
131 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506 (Spring 1951).
132 Id. § 9-504(2).
133Id. § 9-507(1).1341Id. § 9-504(3).
135 Id. § 9-504(2).
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indebtedness of any subordinate security interest in the same
collateral.3 6 Unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable
for any deficiency.
In the case of a purchase money interest in consumer
goods where the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash
price, the secured party in possession of the collateral must
dispose of it within ninety days or be liable in conversion.1
3 7
In all other cases, the secured party in possession may elect
to send written notice to the debtor and other secured parties
stating that the collateral will be retained in complete dis-
charge of the obligation. If an objection ensues within thirty
days, the secured party must dispose of the collateral.138
This default procedure will supersede present New York
statutes which at times unreasonably hamper realization on
collateral. 39  The only creditor restraint which it offers in
replacement however is a vague standard called "commer-
cial reasonableness" which may well result in more anguish
than the cure is worth.
CONCLUSION.
This article is in no way intended as a complete digest
and analysis of all the important changes which the adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code will effect in present New
York Sales and Security Law, nor is it intended as a critique.
However, the more fundamental points of divergence have
been highlighted and the structure of new law outlined on
the assumption that only after the basic theories behind the
Uniform Commercial Code are understood can a proper
evaluation be made of it in entirety.
136 Id. § 9-504(1) (a), (b), (c).
37 Id. § 9-505(1).
138 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(2) (June 1951).
239 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 56, 77-80.
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